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SUFFICIENCY OF THE TITLE TO A LEGISLATIVE ACTENGLE v. BONNIE *
In the recent case of Engle v. Bonnie,' the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky rendered an interesting decision pertaining to the sufficiency of the title to a legislative act-in this state. In 1946 the Kentucky Legislature enacted legislation which revised the law with
respect to the procedure for the establishment of a municipality and
the classification of such new city This legislation was incorporated
in Chapter 42, Acts of 1946, later published as KRS 81.010 et seq.,
and was entitled, "An Act relating to cities." Under the provisions
of these statutes, the required number of voters of the unincorporated community of St. Matthews, a suburb of Louisville, filed a
petition for its incorporation. The incorporation was resisted upon
several grounds, one being that the Act was unconstitutional in that
its title did not comply with the requirements of Section 51 of the
Keritucky Constitution, the pertinent provision of which is as follows: "No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more
"
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title,
The lower court found one section of the Act objectionable as
being arbitrary legislation in that it gave a minority the arbitrary
power to impose their will on the majority,- but the decision of the
Court of Appeals rested squarely on the ground that the title, "An
Act relating to cities," was not sufficiently informative to give reasonable notice that the body of the Act pertained to the incorporation
of communities or the "creation" of cities, and, therefore, the entire
act was unconstitutional. It was said that the title was "deceptive"
in that the Act was not concerned with "existing" cities.
The constitutional section under consideration is a usual provision in state constitutions, and has had its fair share of interpretation
and application by state courts. In Kentucky the decisions concerning
this section since the adoption of the present constitution will number well in excess of two hundred. It has been stated that the mischief which was intended to be remedied by the restrictive provision
of the constitution was to prevent the common practice of embracing
in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other,
or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often
adopted without attracting attention More directly stated, its purpose is to prevent the insertion of "jokers" or "sleepers" in bills and
securing their passage under the false color of the title. That the
provision should be given a liberal, and not a strict, construction
* In preparing this note the writer had an opportunity to consult
appellant's brief in the case.
'305 Ky. 850, 204 S.W 2d 963 (1947).
2 Ky. CON8T., Sec. 2.
3
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Sec.

78 (1891).
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seems to be so universally recognized as not to require comment. In
this connection the supreme court of Minnesota is often quoted:
"Any construction of this provision of the constitution that would interfere with the 'very commendable
policy of incorporating the entire body of statutory law
upon one general subject in a single act, instead of
dividing it into a number of separate acts, would not
only be contrary to its spirit, but also seriously embarrassing to honest legislation. All that is required is that
the act should not include legislation so incongruous
that it could not, by any fair sntendment, be considered germane to one general subject.
The title was
never intended to be an index of the law."' (Italics
writer's.)
However uniform the expression of courts and the textwriters
may be as to the purpose of the constitutional provision, uniformity
is not a characteristic of the way they have applied the requirement
in testing the sufficiency of individual titles. Hence a survey of all
the cases could serve no useful purpose. Instead, if it can be shown
from the standpoint of logic and precedent that the title to the act
in question does, by any reasonable construction, meet the constitutional requirement of preventing the inclusion of incongruous matter, it is believed there are impelling reasons why a different result
should have been reached in the principal case.
The requirements of the constitutional provision under consideration are two in number: (1) No law shall relate to more than one
subject, and, (2) The "subject" to which the act relates must be expressed in the title. The court found no objection to the title in respect to the first, and since there can be no question that "a" subject
is expressed in the title because the court admits it would have been
sufficient for some purposes, the decisive question is whether the
body of the act "relates" to the "subject" of "cities."
As stated previously, the defect which the court found in the
title was that the word cities was misleading in that it referred to
"existing cities." Undoubtedly the court gave that word its technical
meaning of a legal corporation or municipality. It may well be
argued that the word city has a popular connotation which extends
past the limits of any corporate jurisdiction and would at least include an adjoining suburb. Such an argument certainly would not be
without authorityz Webster's New International Dictionary gives
one definition of the word city as, "A town or other inhabited
place," which, obviously is without restriction as to corporate limits.
If the above is a correct interpretation of the popular meaning of
the word city, then its use in the title of a legisltive act is of sufficient scope to cover not only municipalities 7put also unincorporated
communities. It would follow that the general meaning or impression
'Johnson v Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W 923, 924 (1891)
" In Re Washington Monument Fund, etc., 154 Pa. 621, -, 26 Atl.
647, 649 (1893)
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transmitted to the average person by the use of the word city is
much broader than the technical and narrow interpretation adopted
by the court, and the resulting notice given by the use of the word
in the title to a legislative act is correspondingly greater.
But assume, without admittingi that the more narrow interpretation was proper. Even then could it be said with assurance that
the creation of cities is totally and wholly unrelated to the general
topic or concept of "cities" 9 Can it be argued convincingly that those
things concerning the actual operations of an incorporated municipality are the only things which "relate" to it in the constitutional
sense? Or would a change in the classification of a city be "related"
to that general subject? Or the creation of a city9 In view of the
fact that the requirement is satisfied if "the subject expressed in
the act is reasonably specific so as to indicate some particular branch
of legislation as a head under which the particular provision of the
act may reasonably be looked for,"' perhaps as good a test as any
would be to consult the index of a legal digest to determine whether
the scope of the word city, as used in its technical sense signifying
a municipal corporation, is broad enough to include things other than
those affecting existing cities. (Italics writer's.) Invariably one
would find that under such a heading would be found, "Creation,
Alteration, Incidents, Existence. and Dissolution."' (Italics writer's.)
Therefore it is suggested that it would be proper to use the broader
interpretation of the word city in testing the sufficiency of notice
given by its use in the title to a legislative act. But even though the
restricted and technical meaning of the word be adopted, the body
of an act concerning the creation of a city would still be "related"
to such a subject.
Would precedent have sustained a different result in the principal case? As stated before, there have been many decisions written
interpreting the requirements of Section 51, and the language used
has, in most cases, been so general as not to be susceptible of formulating therefrom a tangible and specific standard. Indeed the idea or
concept itself is not so susceptible. The court recognizes this truth in
the instant case, when it says, "It is not easy or possible, perhaps,
to set by metes and bounds the latitude permitted by Section 51 as
to the coincidence of title and body It is easier to say on which side
of the line a given case belongs than to draw a line that will separate
permissible disparities from forbidden ones."' Hence the main value
of the language of former decisions will be not in the language itself
but rather in its application to the specific title then in controversy.
By this method alone can we determine whether the title in the instant case is a "disparity," or at least a "permissible disparity,"
when judged by the standards fixed by former decisions.
'Ule v State. 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140, 144 (1935).
7
See, for instance, the index to 43 C. J.
'305 Ky. 850, 852-853, 204 S.W 2d 963, 964 (1947).
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A leading Kentucky decision which involved the validity of

a general title was Phillips v. Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co.'
Although this case was decided prior to our present constitution, the
provision under consideration was the same as what is now Section
51. In that case the title in question was, "An Act to amend the

charter of the Covington and Cincinnati bridge company." Under
this title the bridge company was empowered to sell and the city of
Covington to subscribe to $100,000.00 of its stock, the payment for
which was to be met by sale of bonds of the city which was authorized to levy a tax to pay the interest thereupon. In upholding the

validity of the title, the court said, "None of the provisions of a
statute should be regarded as unconstitutional where they all relate
directly or indirectly to the same subject, have a natural connection,
and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title."'" (Italics
writer's.) The validity of this decision is still recognized in Kentucky, having been cited with approval as recently as 1943.21 By
comparison, is a law relating to the creation of cities more foreign
to the general title, "An Act relating to cities," than is a law relating
to the levying of taxes on the citizens of the city of Covington to the
title, "An Act to amend the charter of the Covington and Cincinnati
9
bridge company " Obviously it is not. A case in which the title involved was more nearly like the one in the principal case was
Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club.' The title there was, "An
Act concerning gaming." That act dealt with the legalization of
pari-mutuel betting. And its validity was upheld, the court finding
that the details of the act were "germane" to the subject, and stating, "The title
was general, and necessarily covered all matters
concerning gaming, including that embraced as well as that excluded
3
4
from the terms of the law."' In Conley v. Commonwealth the
general title of the Chapter in question was, "CorporationsPrivate"; the title of an article thereunder being, "Railroads." It was
held that the title was sufficient for the law to create a statutory
crime for disturbing a railroad switch or obstructing a railroad track.
The court stated, "It introduces into the chapter nothing foreign to
5
or disconnected from the subject expressed in the title."' If the title
in this case was sufficiently informative for the body of the act to
create a statutory crime, surely the title in the principal case was
sufficiently broad in scope for the body of the act to deal with the
creation of a city.
59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 219 (1859)
" Id. at 222.
"Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 130, 171
S.W 2d 41, 45.
'"238 Ky. 739, 38 S.W 2d 987 (1931)
"Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 758, 38
S.W 2d 987, 996 (1931).
" 98 Ky 125, 32 S.W 285 (1895).
"Conley v Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 125, 130, 32 S.W 285, 287
(1895).
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In Eastern Kentucky Coal Lands Corp. v. Commonwealth l the
title to the act was, "An Act relating to revenue and taxation." The
Court said that under this act railroads and other public service
corporations were required to report information upon which their
assessments were to be based, and their failure to do so was penalized by fine and suspension of their corporate franchise. The sufficiency of the general title to the act was upheld. It is believed that
when the title and body of the act in the principal case are compared
with the various titles and laws enacted thereunder as set forth
above, it becomes apparent that the title was no more foreign to the
subject of the law in the principal case than in the other cases as
decided by the Kentucky Court.
Finally, it is imperative to note the effect which the decision in
the principal case is likely to have -on past as well as future legislation. Principally because of the liberal construction placed on the
constitutional requirement by our court, professional draftsmen of
legislation have tended more and more to generalize the titles to
legislative acts in order to permit 'the legislature to consider in one
act all legislation which pertains to one broad general subject. Indeed, it was never the intent of the framers of the constitution that
it should be otherwise. The experience gamed by drafters of legislation in Kentucky has been reflected in the numerous titles of general
scope, which have accompanied legislation through the enacting
process in the past three sessions of the General Assembly, and
which make no attempt to indicate the nature, contents, or purpose
of the act. Illustrative of these was an act entitled, "An Act relating
to fences,"' which was enacted as Chapter 47 of the 1946 General Assembly " This act does not relate to "existing" fences, but
rather to, the building or "creation" of division fences between adjoining landowners. It provides that, under certain circumstances,
such a fence may be built by one adjoining owner and one-half of
the cost would become a lien against the adjoining land.
Another act was entitled, "An Act relating to marriage. ' ' ' The
substance of this law does not deal with "existing" marriages. Instead it is concerned with the prohibition of the soliciting for compensation of persons to go before. a person authorized to solemnize
marriage for the purpose of being married.
Chapter 72 of the 1946 Acts was entitled, "An Act concerning
armories." Under the interpretation in the principal case, for this
act as well as those mentioned above, to be constitutional, it must
refer only to those armories then in existence. Instead this act pertained to the appropriation out of the General Expenditure Fund the
"1 127 Ky 667, 106 S.W 260 (1907)

7Ky. Acts 1946, p. 114.
n8Ky. Acts 1946, c. 29, p. 53. (An act with a similar title was
enacted as.c. 124, at p. 330, and would be subject to the same criticism.)
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sum of $100,000.00 for the purpose of "Constructing, reconstruction,
9

armories for the use of the Armories Division."'
acquiring,
It would seem. to serve no useful purpose in listing more of these
acts which were enacted with general titles. Suffice it to say that
during the past three sessions of the General Legislature there were
well in excess of one hundred bills enacted with titles similar to the
one declared unconstitutional in the principal case. It is submitted
that the vast majority of those laws are subject to the same criticism
as that levied at the title in the principal case.
The results which may logically be expected to flow from the
decision are three-fold:
1. The door has undoubtedly been opened to a veritable flood
of litigation to test the validity of a large number of statutes which
were enacted under a general title.
2. If the decision in the principal case is adhered to it will
mean that a substantial portion of the efforts of the legislators at the
past three sessions of the General Assembly will be nullified.
3. Future legislation will be enacted under more specific and
restrictive titles, which will either result in an increase in-the number of bills to be enacted to accomplish a single purpose, or will
necessarily expose the bills to the other prohibition contained in Section 51, that of singularity of subject.
In conclusion, as stated previously, courts have been inconsistent in their application of the constitutional requirement to particular titles, some being more liberal than others. Hence the decision
in the principal case is not without some authority, but it is believed that from the standpoint of logic and reason as well as'precedent the decision in the principal case is at least questionable. This
conclusion is strengthened by the well established principle of
statutory construction that there is a presumption in favor of the
validity of any statute. In order for a statute to be nullified because
its subject or object is not expressed in its title the madequacy- must
be substantial, plain, clear, manifest, and unmistakable. If the words
in a title when taken in any sense or meaning they will reasonably
bear cover the provisions of the act, the act should be sustained even
though such meaning may not be the most common meaning of the
words.' In view of the considerable effect wich this decision is
likely to have upon many of the laws now on our statute books, the
court might well have placed a more liberal interpretation on the
requirements of Section 51 and reached a sounder and undoubtedly
a more practical result in the principal case.
JAMES M.

"wKy. Acts 1946, p. 166.
50 AM. Jura, Sec. 170, pp. 150, 151.
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